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If one believes that the brain is, in some as 
yet unspecified way, the organ of mind and 
behaviour, then all human behaviour has a 
neurobiological basis. Neuroscience 
research over the past several decades has 
provided more specific reasons for believing 
that many addictive phenomena have a 
neurobiological basis. The major 
psychoactive drugs of dependence have 
been shown to act on neurotransmitter 
systems in the brain (Nutt 1997; Koob 
2000); common neurochemical mechanisms 
underlie many of the rewarding effects of 
these drugs and the phenomena of 
tolerance and withdrawal symptoms (Hyman 
& Malenka 2001; Koob 2000), and there is 
evidence for a genetic vulnerability to 
addiction (Nestler 2001; Uhl 1999) that is 
mediated by genes that regulate the 
metabolism of psychoactive drugs and the 
brain neurotransmitter systems on which 
they act (Uhl 1999). 
 
Neuroscience research on addiction has the 
potential to improve treatment of drug 
dependence (Nutt 1997). It may lead to 
more effective ways of helping drug-
dependent people to withdraw from their 
drug of dependence and it may increase 
their chances of remaining abstinent (Koob 
2000). We may also have immunological 
prostheses for relapse prevention—‘drug 
vaccines’—that help former addicts remain 
abstinent by preventing their drug of choice 
from acting on receptors in their brains 
during the period when they are most 
vulnerable to relapse (Fox 1997; Hall 2002). 
Genotyping of people seeking help to deal 
with addiction may enable patients to be 
better matched to pharmacological 
treatments, e.g. by predicting whether 
smokers were more likely to quit with 
bupropion or nicotine replacement (Munafo 
et al . 2001; Walton et al . 2001). 
 
Neuroscience perspectives on addiction 
have more mixed social implications for 
‘governing images’ of addiction. According 
to one influential interpreter of neuroscience 
research, addiction is a ‘chronic, relapsing 
brain disease’ (Leshner 1997), a disorder in 
which chronic drug use flicks a metaphorical 
switch in the brain after which the person’s 
drug use is beyond their control (Leshner 
1997). This view challenges the common-
sense view of addiction as a matter of 
individual choice that can be influenced by 
threats of punishment and imprisonment. 
 
A neurochemical basis for addiction makes 
possible a more humane, less punitive 
response to addiction. It raises the prospect 
of increased funding for addiction treatment, 
less resort to imprisonment as the first-line 
treatment for addiction and less 
stigmatization of those who are addicted to 
drugs. It is, for these reasons, a view that 
appeals to some people who are addicted to 
drugs and to some of their families. 
Addiction as a ‘brain disease’ has some of 
the appeal of the older ‘disease models’ of 
addiction, with the added authority of the 
latest science. A ‘disease’ that can be ‘seen’ 
in the many-hued splendour of a PET scan 
carries more conviction than one justified by 
the possibly exculpatory self-reports of 
addicts who claim that they are unable to 
control their drug use. 
 
The depiction of addiction as a brain disease 
has benefited addiction research in the 
competition for funding with neuroscientists 
working on disorders such as dementia, 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. 
Increased funding for neuroscience research 
has meant that some addiction researchers 
have been the beneficiaries of the view that 
addiction is a brain disease, a view about 
which other addiction researchers have 
been more sceptical, if publicly silent about 
the reasons for their scepticism. A reviewer 
of this editorial described the thesis that 
addiction is a chronic brain disease as a 
Faustian bargain that secured increased 
research funding but with costs that are only 
now becoming apparent. 
 
Simplified versions of neuroscience views of 
addiction depict addicts’ behaviour as being 
controlled by the state of their brain 
receptors and neurotransmitter systems. 
This view seems to warrant heroic treatment 
interventions, such as ultra-rapid opiate 
detoxification for heroin dependence, 
encouraging impoverished patients and their 
families to pay the substantial sums charged 
for these treatments by some entrepreneurs 
(Hall 2000). A chronic relapsing brain 
disease may also be seen as authorizing 
legally coerced treatment because 
drugdependent people are incapable of 
acting in their own best interests. 
 
Another possible disadvantage of a 
neuroscience-based disease model of 
addiction is now emerging. Bioethicists in 
the United States have argued recently that 
addicts lack the capacity to give free and 
informed consent to participate in: (1) 
experimental neurobiological studies of 
addiction (e.g. using PET scans) that involve 
giving drugs of dependence to addicts 
(Cohen 2002); and (2) clinical trials of 
injectable heroin as a treatment for opioid 
dependence (Charland 2002). The 
requirement that research participants 
provide free and informed consent has been 
an ethical sine qua non of biomedical 
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research since the Nuremberg Code (Brody 
1998). Hence, if these bioethicists’ 
arguments are accepted by ethical review 
committees, they will severely constrain the 
type of research that it is ethical to conduct 
in the country that funds most of the world’s 
research on addiction. Until now, the view 
among addiction researchers has been that 
drug-dependent people are able to give free 
and informed consent to participate in 
research studies and clinical trials so long as 
they are not intoxicated or suffering acute 
withdrawal symptoms at the time that they 
give consent (e.g. College on Problems of 
Drug Dependence 1995; Gorelick et al . 
1998). This view has been called into 
question by Charland (2002) and Cohen 
(2002), who have taken the defining 
characteristics of drug dependence in DSM-
IV—especially the loss of control over drug 
use—to mean that people who are drug 
dependent lack the capacity to give free and 
informed consent to participate in research 
studies in which they may be given their 
drug of dependence. 
 
Cohen (2002) argues that ‘the nature and 
pathology of untreated substance 
dependence make the condition inherently 
incompatible with a rational, internally 
uncoerced and informed consent on the part 
of those volunteering to receive addictive 
drugs in a non-therapeutic research setting’ 
(p. 74). This ‘may no longer obtain’, he 
argues, after addicts have undergone 
treatment. According to Cohen, it is only 
ethical to give drugs of dependence in 
experimental studies to abstinent addicts 
and, possibly, those who are already in 
treatment. 
 
Even though research suggests that alcohol 
and drug-dependent people who participate 
in research are helped rather than harmed 
(e.g. Dolinsky & Babor 1997; Gorelick et al . 
1998), we anticipate a lack of enthusiasm 
among members of ethics committees for 
allowing studies that administer drugs of 
dependence to abstinent addicts. We think it 
is more likely that ethics committees will 
accept the first of Cohen’s arguments and 
reject the second. If so, the outcome will be 
that no experimental research will be 
permitted in which drug-dependent people 
receive their drug of dependence. 
 
Charland (2002) has used a similar 
argument to arrive at the conclusion that 
heroin addicts are unable to give free and 
informed consent to participate in heroin 
prescription trials. Heroin addicts, he argues 
on the testimony of one former heroin 
addict, are incapable of saying ‘no’ to the 
offer of free heroin because of their 
addiction. Untreated heroin addicts offered 
their drug of dependence are ‘vulnerable 
subjects’ in the terminology of the US 
National Bioethics Advisory Committee 
(1998), which means that they cannot serve 
as experimental subjects in such studies, or 
they can do so only if consent is given on 
their behalf by others. If taken seriously 
these views would prevent addicts from 
participating in clinical research from which 
they stand to benefit. Even if not fully 
accepted, such arguments may reduce the 
preparedness of ethics committees to allow 
clinical and experimental research on 
addiction that involves the use of drugs of 
dependence. 
 
Charland argues that the only free and 
informed decision that an addict is capable 
of making is to enter abstinence- orientated 
treatment. However, using Charland’s 
reasoning, even this decision may not be 
truly free or informed. Many addicts enter 
abstinent-orientated treatment under some 
form of coercion, either the threat of criminal 
prosecution or the loss of employment or a 
relationship. Heroin addicts who enter such 
treatment may overestimate their capacity to 
achieve abstinence, underestimate the 
difficulties of remaining abstinent, and may 
not appreciate the risks of attempting 
abstinence (e.g. of fatal overdose on relapse 
to heroin use). If the standards for free and 
informed consent are set high enough, no 
one will meet them. Most people who 
become parents, for example, would 
probably concede in retrospect that this was 
not a decision to which they gave informed 
consent. We do not use this fact, however, 
to prevent people from reproducing. Partially 
informed decisions, misplaced confidence 
and decisional regret are an integral part of 
the human condition. 
 
Charland’s claim that heroin users are 
unable to say ‘no’ to an offer of heroin is 
also empirically false because the Swiss 
heroin trials were not inundated with 
untreated heroin addicts demanding ‘free 
heroin’. This is clear in the report of a 
randomized controlled trial of immediate 
versus delayed entry to heroin maintenance 
(with the delayed entry group given access 
to usual treatment, methadone maintenance 
or abstinence) (Perneger et al . 1998). The 
researchers intended to recruit 40 patients in 
each group but recruited only 24 and 27 
patients, respectively. Moreover, when 
offered the choice at the end of 6 months, 
two-thirds of those in the delayed entry to 
heroin treatment group decided against 
receiving heroin (Perneger et al . 1998). 
Severely dependent treatment refractory 
Swiss heroin addicts were thus capable of 
saying ‘no’ to an offer of heroin prescription. 
 
Charland does not place heroin 
maintenance within a realistic set of 
alternatives for heroin addicts who have 
failed repeatedly at treatment, in whom the 
chances of achieving enduring abstinence 
are very low. Instead, he assumes 
unrealistically that most heroin users 
seeking some form of heroin maintenance 
treatment have a high chance of achieving 
abstinence in abstinence-orientated 
treatment programmes. He assumes 
implicitly that entry to heroin maintenance 
treatment reduces the chances of achieving 
abstinence. Both assumptions are probably 
wrong. Longitudinal studies of heroin-
dependent people show that annual rates of 
achieving enduring abstinence are not very 
different from the annual mortality rate  
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(Gerstein & Harwood 1990, ch. 4; Hser et al 
. 1993; Goldstein & Herrera 1995). 
Moreover, rates of abstinence 5 years after 
treatment entry are the same in people who 
enter drug-free treatment as in those who 
enter methadone maintenance (Maddux & 
Desmond 1992). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Neuroscience models have much to offer 
the field of addiction, but they will be self-
defeating if they lead to severe restrictions 
on the type of neuroscience research that 
can conducted in future. A major challenge 
for the addiction field is to integrate the 
insights that neuroscience research has 
provided on drug use and addiction with 
those provided about drug use and addiction 
by clinical, epidemiological, sociological and 
economic research. The challenge is (1) to 
develop theories of addiction that take 
seriously the neurobiological bases for drug 
effects and addictive phenomena; (2) 
without depicting addicts as automatons 
whose behaviour is under the control of the 
drugs acting on the receptors sites in their 
brains; and (3) while recognizing the 
opportunities for individual decision, 
interpersonal influence and social policy to 
affect the drug use and the behaviour of 
drug-dependent people. 
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